In April 2024, Microsoft announced a $1.5 billion investment in G421, an Abu Dhabi-based technology company seeking to expand its AI business. The agreement followed negotiations over G42's relationships with Chinese technology companies, particularly Huawei. As Steve Feldstein explains in his book Bytes and Bullets2, American officials were concerned that these relationships could undermine restrictions on China's access to advanced technologies. G42 reduced its cooperation with Chinese suppliers and entered into a partnership that gave Microsoft a minority stake in the Emirati company.
The negotiations illustrate the opportunities and constraints facing middle powers seeking technological autonomy. The UAE gained access to American technology and a partner capable of supporting its domestic AI industry. Washington advanced its effort to limit Chinese technological influence in the Gulf. Although both sides benefited, the technologies involved remained subject to American export regulations. That condition still applies. Under a July 2026 rule, G42's license-free access to advanced American chips expires on April 6, 2027, unless the company becomes a U.S. company or receives further authorization.3 This raises a broader question concerning the extent to which financial resources and international partnerships provide control over the technologies that countries seek to acquire.
Saudi Arabia and the UAE can finance computing facilities on a scale that few other middle powers can match. However, neither produces the advanced processors required for these facilities. In this piece, I examine technological autonomy through three related dimensions. The first concerns obtaining advanced computing equipment on reliable terms. The second concerns domestic control over the operation and use of computing infrastructure. The third concerns the security and continuity of computing services during military disruption.
The piece argues that Gulf investments have strengthened the bargaining position of Saudi Arabia and the UAE by attracting leading technology companies and improving access to advanced computing equipment. However, partnerships with competing American suppliers leave both countries dependent on the government regulating their exports. Thus, Washington continues to influence the expansion and upgrading of domestic facilities. The Iran war has also demonstrated that building infrastructure at home does not guarantee that it will keep running, and has revealed the importance of critical infrastructure security. Technological autonomy in this sense does not require producing every component domestically. It concerns the conditions under which domestic institutions can obtain and continue using technologies developed elsewhere.
Key dates
- Apr 2024Microsoft invests $1.5 billion in G42, after G42 scales back cooperation with Chinese suppliers
- May 2025Stargate UAE announced; Saudi Arabia's Public Investment Fund launches HUMAIN
- Nov 2025US authorizes G42 and HUMAIN to buy chips equivalent to up to 35,000 NVIDIA GB300s each
- Feb 2026US and Israeli strikes on Iran; Iranian retaliation damages AWS facilities in the UAE and Bahrain
- Apr 2026Iran's Revolutionary Guard threatens the planned Stargate UAE campus
- Jul 2026New US rule eases export controls for the UAE, but sets an expiry date for G42's license-free access
- Sep 2026AWS says it cannot restore its Bahrain region or one UAE zone; the UAE considers revising the Stargate campus
- Oct 2026Houthi attack on Riyadh's airport kills 13; Saudi Arabia postpones its Future Investment Initiative
- Apr 2027G42's license-free access to advanced American chips is due to expire
Developing AI infrastructure in the Gulf
Saudi Arabia and the UAE have attracted technology companies by offering capital, land, electricity and supporting infrastructure.
In May 2025, G42, OpenAI, Oracle, NVIDIA, Cisco and SoftBank announced Stargate UAE4, a planned one-gigawatt computing cluster within a proposed five-gigawatt campus in Abu Dhabi. G42 would build the cluster, while OpenAI and Oracle would operate it. The partners expected the first 200 megawatts to become operational in 2026. The arrangement combines Emirati investment with foreign equipment and operational expertise. Also, it shows why the location of a facility and responsibility for operating it should be examined separately. The announced division of responsibilities provides information about the companies involved, although the full commercial terms are not public.
Saudi Arabia has pursued a similar objective through HUMAIN, which its Public Investment Fund established in May 20255. HUMAIN has developed partnerships with AMD, Cisco and NVIDIA.6 In August 2026, AMD, Cisco and HUMAIN announced7 that systems using AMD Instinct MI355X processors had entered production. They also outlined additional capacity beginning in 2027 and an objective of reaching one gigawatt by 2030. Moreover, HUMAIN is expected to develop domestic AI services and models alongside its computing facilities. The success of this effort will depend partly on whether its international partnerships support local technical capabilities as well as infrastructure construction.
Domestic institutions have also developed AI capabilities beyond financing computing facilities. In the UAE, G42's Core42 operates sovereign cloud and AI infrastructure8, while Abu Dhabi's Technology Innovation Institute developed the open-source Falcon model family9. In Saudi Arabia, HUMAIN launched HUMAIN Chat in August 2025, using its ALLaM 34B Arabic-language model on Saudi-hosted infrastructure10. These initiatives demonstrate domestic experience in providing cloud services and developing AI models. The extent to which new computing investments strengthen these capabilities also depends on the access they provide to domestic researchers, firms and public institutions.
Export controls and access to advanced technology
Farrell and Newman (2019), in their influential study of weaponized interdependence11, explain how states occupying important positions within international networks can exercise influence over others. I think their argument is relevant to advanced AI processors, which are supplied by a relatively small number of companies and remain subject to export regulations.
The G42 negotiations show how these conditions influence commercial relationships. Feldstein shows that American officials feared Beijing could use G42 to siphon advanced U.S. chips to China, and that Chinese firms could gain access to the genomic data of millions of Americans through G42's DNA sequencing project. National security adviser Jake Sullivan raised these concerns with Sheikh Tahnoon bin Zayed in June 2023, and Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo later told him that G42 had to choose a side. By the end of 2023, G42 had agreed to sever its Chinese relationships and phase out Huawei hardware, and in return it was assured continued access to NVIDIA chips. Its Chinese investments, however, moved to Lunate, a new fund also controlled by Sheikh Tahnoon. Then the Biden administration helped G42 find an American partner, and Raimondo was closely involved in the negotiations with Microsoft.2 Under the April 2024 agreement, G42 committed to using Microsoft Azure for its AI applications and services, alongside security commitments developed in consultation with both governments.1 Mulani and Fort12 also doubt how far this decoupling has gone. They note that e&, the UAE's state-owned telecommunications company, continues to work with both Microsoft and Huawei. They also suggest that the UAE's partnerships with the United States reflect a pragmatic strategy to hedge bets on which power will prevail in the AI race.12
On November 19, 2025, the U.S. Department of Commerce authorized13 G42 and Saudi Arabia's HUMAIN to purchase advanced computing equipment equivalent to up to 35,000 NVIDIA GB300 processors each. Both approvals carried security and reporting requirements. The decision expanded access for the two countries while demonstrating that purchasing power alone did not determine which technologies they could obtain.
The UAE subsequently received more favorable treatment. A July 2026 final rule3 moved the country from Country Groups D:3 and D:4 to A:5, expanding eligibility for specified exports and license exceptions. The Commerce Department's accompanying announcement14 described the revised framework. Under the rule, G42 and Core42, a G42 subsidiary, could receive certain advanced computing items without individual export licenses.
Nevertheless, the authorization for G42 and Core42 is scheduled to expire on April 6, 2027, unless the Bureau of Industry and Security issues a subsequent notice. If the two companies have not become U.S. companies by that date, they will need to apply for authorization through the bureau's advisory-opinion process to maintain their approved status. The rule sets no expiry date for the eight U.S.-headquartered AI companies it approves, including Microsoft, Oracle and OpenAI. These companies and their UAE subsidiaries may also use License Exception Strategic Trade Authorization, which is not available to G42 and Core42.3 This means the rule provides different conditions for Emirati and American companies operating in the same country.
The July changes did not extend to Saudi Arabia, whose HUMAIN continued to rely on its company-specific approval. The July rule did not affect HUMAIN's November 2025 authorization. G42 and HUMAIN received comparable authorizations in November 2025 but subsequently faced different regulatory arrangements. Because the July regulation governs future transfers of advanced computing items, it also shapes access to the equipment required to upgrade and expand computing systems. For investments extending over many years, the terms governing future transfers may be as important as the initial authorization. Computing facilities require successive generations of processors and networking equipment. A government may possess considerable bargaining power when financing a new project while remaining dependent on regulatory decisions when the project needs expansion or replacement equipment.
A government may possess considerable bargaining power when financing a new project while remaining dependent on regulatory decisions when the project needs expansion or replacement equipment.
International partnerships and domestic capabilities
Dependence on foreign technology does not remove the bargaining opportunities available to Gulf governments. Building large computing facilities requires capital, electricity, land and access to markets. As Phillips-Robins, Tawil and Winter-Levy15 suggest, countries able to attract computing investment can negotiate for improved access to advanced AI. The same authors argue that leverage over semiconductor supply chain chokepoints is especially valuable. Hosting computing infrastructure also generates bargaining power, although it does not provide the same leverage as controlling scarce semiconductor technologies.
The Microsoft-G42 agreement shows the benefits and costs of these partnerships. G42 obtained access to Microsoft's advanced GPUs and permission to sell Microsoft services, while Microsoft gained an ownership stake and a partner that could help it enter markets in Asia, Africa and Latin America and compete with Chinese cloud providers.2 Feldstein explains that Microsoft expected the agreement to "lock in" the UAE into its technical ecosystem, because the switching costs of transferring data and rebuilding software infrastructure around another provider would deter customers from leaving.2 Once a firm builds its applications and staff expertise around one platform, moving to another becomes costly. The benefits of a partnership can be assessed together with the ability of domestic firms to maintain and adapt their services if commercial circumstances change.
It is possible to argue that operational arrangements are equally important. The Stargate UAE plan assigns construction to G42 and operation to OpenAI and Oracle.4 Public announcements provide limited information about how these companies share decisions concerning computing capacity and how much will be available to domestic researchers and firms. HUMAIN's October 2026 expansion with NVIDIA, for example, involves 84 megawatts of planned computing capacity, with 50 megawatts dedicated to an unnamed American customer.16 These arrangements show how domestic cloud services and model development can coexist with new computing projects whose operating responsibilities and customer allocations involve foreign companies. Access for local researchers and firms consequently depends partly on those commercial arrangements.
Gulf governments can reduce these dependencies in two ways. The Tony Blair Institute for Global Change17 argues that middle powers can improve their technological position by investing in open-source software and interoperable systems, and by using procurement to require interoperability. Such capabilities may reduce switching costs and make domestic applications less dependent on individual providers. Similarly, Saudi partnerships with AMD and NVIDIA can expand procurement options, although both companies remain subject to American export controls. Jagtiani and Kausch18 characterize middle power agency in AI as meaningful but limited. Both options fit this description, because they reduce dependence on individual companies while leaving export decisions in American hands.
Technological autonomy in this sense does not require producing every component domestically.
Consequently, the value of Gulf partnerships depends partly on the domestic capabilities they help develop. Interoperable software may ease movement between cloud providers, but it arguably cannot secure the processors on which those providers depend. Financial resources can secure investments and commercial agreements, but long-term autonomy also requires operational expertise and some flexibility over technology suppliers.
The Iran war and infrastructure security
The Iran war has exposed another vulnerability associated with computing infrastructure in the Gulf. Following American and Israeli strikes against Iran on February 28, 2026, Iranian retaliatory attacks damaged Amazon Web Services facilities in the region. AWS reported that two facilities in the UAE were directly struck, while infrastructure in Bahrain was also damaged.19 These attacks disrupted services used by businesses and other institutions. The incidents were especially consequential because cloud services support activities beyond the facilities themselves. Damage at one location can affect clients and institutions that rely on the same regional infrastructure.
In its September 15 updates,19 AWS reported that it could not restore access to resources and data hosted exclusively in its Bahrain cloud region. It reached the same conclusion for one of its three UAE availability zones, while recovery continued in the other two. The damage showed that even established commercial cloud systems could experience prolonged disruption.
The AWS attacks damaged commercial cloud facilities, but Iran also signaled that the new AI projects were potential targets. In April 2026, Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps threatened the planned Stargate UAE campus in Abu Dhabi.20 In September, Reuters reported21 that the UAE was considering revisions to its planned five-gigawatt campus, including dispersed sites and additional protection against drone and missile attacks. The initial Stargate UAE phase was expected to proceed with modifications. Saudi Arabia faces similar risks. A Houthi attack on Riyadh's King Khalid International Airport on October 10, 2026, killed 13 people. Saudi Arabia subsequently postponed its Future Investment Initiative conference.22
The war has also influenced investment decisions and the design of infrastructure protection. The International Institute for Strategic Studies reports that Pure Data Centres Group paused investment decisions following attacks on regional data centers, while other major technology investments continued. The IISS identifies underground server installations, reinforced generator facilities and additional server redundancy as measures for protecting AI infrastructure23. These measures address the ability to maintain computing services when individual sites are damaged, alongside the cost of building and protecting new facilities.
Assessments of the longer-term consequences differ. Aaron Bartnick24 argues that Washington's decision to encourage American companies to build AI infrastructure in the Gulf was a mistake and that companies should reconsider projects still in their planning stages. Justin Alexander25 argues that the Gulf can remain an important AI hub because its advantages in capital and energy persist despite the war. Gulf states may continue to attract investment while facing higher costs for protecting facilities and ensuring continuity.
For technological autonomy, the question is whether domestic institutions can maintain computing services during disruptions. Doing so requires the ability to restore data and transfer workloads when a particular site is unavailable. Backup facilities and distributed infrastructure may improve resilience, although reliance on facilities abroad would introduce additional dependence on foreign providers and jurisdictions.
The UAE and Saudi Arabia at a glance
| Dimension | United Arab Emirates | Saudi Arabia |
|---|---|---|
| Flagship project | Stargate UAE: a 1-gigawatt cluster within a planned 5-gigawatt campus in Abu Dhabi | HUMAIN, launched by the Public Investment Fund in May 2025; aims for 1 gigawatt by 2030 |
| Main partners | Microsoft, OpenAI, Oracle, NVIDIA, Cisco, SoftBank | AMD, Cisco, NVIDIA |
| Domestic capabilities | Core42 sovereign cloud; Falcon open-source models (Technology Innovation Institute) | HUMAIN Chat, built on the ALLaM 34B Arabic-language model |
| Access US chip approvals | Up to 35,000 GB300-equivalent processors for G42 (Nov 2025). July 2026 rule eases controls, but G42’s license-free access expires April 6, 2027 | Up to 35,000 GB300-equivalent processors for HUMAIN (Nov 2025). Not covered by the July 2026 rule |
| Control Who runs the facilities | G42 builds Stargate UAE; OpenAI and Oracle operate it. G42 committed to Microsoft Azure | Of 84 megawatts planned with NVIDIA, 50 are dedicated to an unnamed American customer |
| Continuity Exposure to the Iran war | Iranian strikes hit two AWS facilities, and one AWS availability zone could not be restored. Iran’s Revolutionary Guard threatened the Stargate UAE campus | Houthi attack on Riyadh’s airport killed 13; the Future Investment Initiative conference was postponed |
Implications for technological autonomy
The Gulf experience suggests that computing investments should be assessed by the capabilities available to domestic institutions. The three capabilities examined in this piece provide a basis for this assessment, and each points to a priority for Gulf governments.
First, Gulf governments can seek more predictable access to advanced processors and future upgrades. Second, partnerships should provide domestic institutions with computing resources and opportunities to acquire technical expertise, building on local experience in cloud services and model development and extending it to operating large computing facilities. Third, governments should plan for disruptions through backup capacity and recovery arrangements that do not depend on a single facility or provider. These measures may involve additional costs and cooperation with foreign companies, but they can improve the reliability of domestic services. They also provide criteria for evaluating whether big investment announcements translate into capabilities available to local institutions.
These priorities do not require Saudi Arabia or the UAE to reproduce the entire semiconductor supply chain. International specialization makes such an objective costly and potentially unnecessary. Gulf countries have shown that capital and infrastructure investment can attract leading technology companies. The G42 negotiations and the different export arrangements governing Saudi and Emirati firms show that partnerships with competing suppliers do not eliminate dependence on American regulatory authority. The Iran war has also demonstrated the physical vulnerability of regional computing infrastructure. Gulf investments can expand domestic capacity and improve commercial bargaining terms, but Washington continues to influence future technology access, while regional conflict can disrupt facilities that Gulf governments have financed and built.
Notes
- Microsoft, "Microsoft invests $1.5 billion in Abu Dhabi's G42 to accelerate AI development and global expansion," April 16, 2024. news.microsoft.com/source/2024/04/16/microsoft-invests-1-5-billion-in-abu-dhabis-g42-to-accelerate-ai-development-and-global-expansion ↩ ↩
- Steve Feldstein, Bytes and Bullets, chapter 23, "The Emiratis' Bid to Become an AI Power," St. Martin's Press, 2026. academic.macmillan.com/academictrade/9781250394088/bytesandbullets ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩
- Bureau of Industry and Security, "Enhanced Favorable Treatment for the United Arab Emirates Under the Export Administration Regulations," Federal Register, July 14, 2026. federalregister.gov/d/2026-14132 ↩ ↩ ↩
- OpenAI, "Introducing Stargate UAE," May 22, 2025. openai.com/index/introducing-stargate-uae See also G42, "Global Tech Alliance Launches Stargate UAE." g42.ai/resources/news/global-tech-alliance-launches-stargate-uae ↩ ↩
- Public Investment Fund, "HRH Crown Prince launches HUMAIN as global AI powerhouse," May 12, 2025. pif.gov.sa/en/news-and-insights/press-releases/2025/hrh-crown-prince-launches-humain-as-global-ai-powerhouse ↩
- NVIDIA, "HUMAIN and NVIDIA Announce Strategic Partnership to Build AI Factories of the Future in Saudi Arabia," May 13, 2025. nvidianews.nvidia.com/news/humain-and-nvidia-announce-strategic-partnership-to-build-ai-factories-of-the-future-in-saudi-arabia ↩
- AMD, "AMD, Cisco and HUMAIN Expand Saudi Arabia's AI Infrastructure as AMD Instinct Systems Go Live," August 31, 2026. ir.amd.com/news-events/press-releases/detail/1298/amd-cisco-and-humain-expand-saudi-arabias-ai-infrastructure-as-amd-instinct-systems-go-live ↩
- Core42, "About Core42," company overview. core42.ai/about ↩
- Advanced Technology Research Council, "TII Launches Open Source Falcon 40B Large AI Model for All," May 25, 2023. atrc.gov.ae/news/uaes-technology-innovation-institute-launches-open-source-falcon-40b-large-language-model ↩
- Saudi Press Agency, "HUMAIN Launches HUMAIN Chat, Powered by ALLaM 34B," August 25, 2025. spa.gov.sa/en/N2385004 ↩
- Henry Farrell and Abraham L. Newman, "Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion," International Security 44, no. 1 (2019). doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00351 ↩
- Nikhil Mulani and Kristina Fort, "AI oases: Leveraging Gulf AI ambitions for U.S. strategic objectives," Cambridge Forum on Technology and Global Affairs 1 (2026), e2. doi.org/10.1017/S2977670826100013 ↩ ↩
- U.S. Department of Commerce, "Statement on UAE and Saudi Chip Exports," November 19, 2025. commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2025/11/statement-uae-and-saudi-chip-exports ↩
- Bureau of Industry and Security, "Department of Commerce Eases Export Controls for UAE," July 10, 2026. media.bis.gov/press-release/department-commerce-eases-export-controls-uae ↩
- Alasdair Phillips-Robins, Teddy Tawil and Sam Winter-Levy, "How Middle Powers Can Survive the AI Race," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 28, 2026. carnegieendowment.org/research/2026/10/ai-frontier-technology-middle-power-countries-four-scenarios ↩
- The National, "Saudi Arabia's Humain expands Nvidia deal with 84MW AI computing plan," October 22, 2026. thenationalnews.com/future/technology/2026/10/22/saudi-arabias-humain-expands-nvidia-deal-with-84mw-ai-computing-plan ↩
- Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, "Build the Roads, Not the Engine: An Open-Source Strategy for Middle-Power AI Sovereignty," September 14, 2026. institute.global/insights/tech-and-digitalisation/build-the-roads-not-the-engine-an-open-source-strategy-for-middle-power-ai-sovereignty ↩
- Sharinee Jagtiani and Kristina Kausch, "Middle Powers' Bounded Ambition in AI," German Marshall Fund of the United States, October 22, 2026. gmfus.org/news/middle-powers-bounded-ambition-ai ↩
- Feras Dalatey, Reuters, "Amazon's AWS is unable to restore access to Bahrain, one UAE cloud data zone after war damage," September 15, 2026. reuters.com/world/middle-east/amazons-aws-is-unable-restore-access-bahrain-one-uae-cloud-data-zone-after-war-2026-09-15. See also Amazon Web Services, AWS Health Dashboard updates on regional service disruptions, March and September 15, 2026, health.aws.amazon.com/health/status ↩ ↩
- Sebastian Moss, "Iran threatens to attack OpenAI's Stargate data center in UAE," Data Center Dynamics, April 7, 2026. datacenterdynamics.com/en/news/iran-threatens-to-attack-openais-stargate-data-center-in-uae-war ↩
- Alexander Cornwell, Rami Ayyub and Timour Azhari, "UAE revises AI data center plan after Iranian attacks, sources say," Reuters, September 11, 2026. reuters.com/world/middle-east/uae-revises-ai-data-center-plan-after-iranian-attacks-sources-say-2026-09-11 ↩
- Gianluca Lo Nostro, "How Houthi attacks have grounded flights across Saudi Arabia," Reuters, October 26, 2026. reuters.com/world/middle-east/how-houthi-attacks-have-grounded-flights-across-saudi-arabia-2026-10-26; Timour Azhari, Federico Maccioni, Tala Ramadan, and Alexander Cornwell, "Saudi Arabia postpones its 'Davos in the Desert' conference after attacks," Reuters, October 19, 2026. reuters.com/world/middle-east/saudi-fii-postpones-flagship-conference-until-2027-2026-10-19 ↩
- International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Gulf at War: Geopolitical, Defence and Geo-economic Dimensions, October 2026, pp. 138–139, 151. iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/the-gulf-at-war-strategic-security-and-geo-economic-dimensions ↩
- Aaron Bartnick, "Silicon Valley's Bad Bet on the Gulf," Foreign Affairs, June 11, 2026. foreignaffairs.com/persian-gulf/silicon-valleys-bad-bet-gulf ↩
- Justin Alexander, "Gulf States Retain Advantages in the AI Race Despite War," Baker Institute for Public Policy, April 10, 2026. bakerinstitute.org/research/gulf-states-retain-advantages-ai-race-despite-war ↩